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2Determinants of the use of financial reporting standards by
Australian pension plans
Abstract
Previous empirical research demonstrates that the voluntary disclosure of defined
benefit pension plan (DBPP) information by employers is value-relevant to investors
and carries potential proprietary costs.  This paper extends these findings in the
context of the voluntary use of financial reporting standards (FRS) in annual reports
sent by pension plans to their participants. FRS use is predicted to be related to
proprietary costs for defined benefit pension plans (DBPPs) and to political visibility
for defined contribution pension plans (DCPPs). Tests on the voluntary reporting
practices of samples of 54 Australian DCPPs and 54 DBPPs during 1991-92 support
these predictions.
Keywords: pension plans, financial reporting standards
Classification codes: D82, G22, J41.
31. Introduction
Scott (1994) examines the voluntary disclosure of defined benefit pension plan
(DBPP) information by a sample of 288 Canadian firms in 1987. Consistent with the
implications of Verrecchia’s (1983) proprietary cost theory, he finds that its disclosure
is mitigated by both proprietary cost and news favorableness effects. However Scott
(1994) does not examine the proprietary cost implications of reporting equivalent
financial information to pension plan participants by managers of either (i) DBPPs, or
(ii) defined contribution funded pension plans (DCPPs).1
The contractual relationship between pension funds and their participants
differs substantially from that between managers and shareholders of companies.
First, in common with other types of financial intermediary, pension funds benefit
from regular inflows of funds on a contractual basis and from long term liabilities
(Brennan, 1993). Second, contractual rights and obligations between participants and
the pension funds (e.g.: entry, exit and annual reporting) are subject to rigid pre-
determined rules rather than determined by market forces (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Third, proprietary cost disclosure theory assumes that voluntary corporate disclosure
is directed at professional investors, whereas equivalent information in pension plan
annual financial reports is sent to a much larger and more diffuse set of individual
participants. Pension plans are increasingly attracting world-wide attention by public
policy makers in many countries as a means of facilitating retirement income savings
by the ageing workforce (World Bank, 1994). However, previous research has not
examined incentives facing pension plan managers to voluntarily disclose financial
information which has potential proprietary cost or political visibility implications.
4Pension plans are usually either defined benefit or defined contribution
funded, which may significantly affect incentives for voluntary financial reporting.
Scott (1994) notes that the disclosure of DBPP information provides a rich
environment to study disclosure and proprietary cost effects because of evidence that
this information is value-relevant and carries potential proprietary costs. By contrast,
defined contribution pension plan (DCPP) information is not value-relevant to firms
because it does not affect the funding and investment policies of the pension plans
they sponsor (Bodie, 1990). DCPP disclosure incentives are posited to be influenced
by their political visibility (Lim and McKinnon, 1993).
This study extends Scott’s (1994) empirical study by developing testable
hypotheses and empirical surrogates for the proprietary cost and political visibility
implications of the voluntary use of financial reporting standards by Australian
DBPPs and DCPPs during 1991-92. Results are consistent with Verrecchia’s (1983)
proprietary cost theory for DBPPs and the political visbility hypothesis for DCPPs.
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. Section 2
reviews the theoretical antecedents and provides an overview of alternative financial
reporting standards which were available to Australian pension plans in the period
1991-92. Section 3 develops proprietary cost and political visibility hypotheses.
Section 4 discusses the sample and develops empirical proxies. Section 5 presents
results and section 6 contains a summary and conclusion.
2. Theoretical Background and Institutional Setting
2.1. Disclosure theories explaining voluntary financial reporting by pension plans
5Scott (1994) reviews the testable implications of Verrecchia’s (1983)
proprietary cost theory, in which the threshold level of disclosure is measured in the
favorableness of news and is increasing in proprietary cost. These effects are
offsetting, so that the incentive not to disclose is increasing in the size of proprietary
costs, resulting in the disclosure of only more favorable news. Thus, the theory
divides into two general hypotheses. First, the probability of disclosing information is
negatively associated with the proprietary costs attached to the disclosure, ceteris
paribus. Second, the probability of a firm disclosing information is positively
associated with the favorableness of the news in the disclosure, ceteris paribus.2
Verrecchia’s (1983) proprietary cost theory has testable implications for
explaining voluntary disclosure incentives facing firms whenever information is
value-relevant and proprietary costs are important. However it does not directly bear
upon settings where equivalent disclosures are made by entities absent proprietary
costs.3 Lim and McKinnon (1993) examine voluntary disclosure practices of 50
commercial and semi-commercial statutory authorities in the Australian State of New
South Wales in 1984.  They hypothesize that, compared to authorities with low
political visibility, authorities with high political visibility will voluntarily disclose
more information of a ‘non-sensitive nature’, but will not disclose more information
of a ‘sensitive’ nature. Their results are consistent with these hypothesized relations.
However Lim and McKinnon (1993) fail to define precisely what is meant by
‘sensitive information disclosure’ or describe is consequences, noting only that it is
financial in nature and “attracts unfavorable attention and questions which may lead
to the imposition of political costs”. Indeed, they acknowledge that the distinction
between ‘sensitive’ and ‘non-sensitive’ is not clear-cut (p. 203). By contrast,
Verrecchia (1983) posits that a potential proprietary cost is any possible reduction in
6future cash flows attributable to a disclosure and cites the example of a union’s
response to an announcement that a firm’s fortunes had improved (p. 182).
2.2. An institutional setting for voluntary disclosure
Financial reporting by Australian pension plans to their participants is a
suitable institutional setting for testing these disclosure theories for four reasons.
First, Cramer and Neyhart (1980) show that pension plan financial information is
value-relevant to plan participants. Second, in Australia this information is not readily
available elsewhere. There are no accounting standards in Australia which require
employer sponsors to disclose pension asset and liability information.4 Third,
anecdotal evidence indicates that Australian pension plans faced a very high level of
political scrutiny in the early 1990s (Klumpes 1994b). This has testable implications
for political visibility influencing voluntary financial reporting by DCPPs to pension
plan participants. Fourth, during 1991-92, as part of the development of these
regulations, alternative financial reporting formats were available and at least some
DCPP and DBPP managers were expected to face political or economic incentives to
voluntarily use either of these options.5 Although the regulatory environment has now
changed, this earlier period allows for powerful tests of the relation between
disclosure incentives and the use of alternative financial reporting standards.
As the social, economic and political significance of Australian pension plans
increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Australian pension plan industry
developed ‘best practice’ guidelines for annual reporting to participants (‘industry
recommended guidelines’, hereinafter ‘IRG’). IRG recommended that pension plan
managers prepare abbreviated financial reports which comprised only a summary
7statement of the net assets available to pay pension benefits. Under IRG the present
value of future accrued pension obligations payable to employee participants
(‘accrued benefit obligation’, hereinafter ‘ABO’) is deemed an actuarial calculation
only and hence is not required for inclusion in pension plan annual reports.
In 1990 the Australian Accounting Standards Board issued a uniform financial
reporting standard applicable to both DCPPs and DBPPs (Australian Accounting
Standard AAS 25 – ‘Financial Reporting by Superannuation Plans’, hereinafter
‘FRS’) which required all pension plans to disclose their ABO, thus revealing their
periodic net surplus or deficiency. However the Australian pension industry actively
lobbied against FRS on the grounds that the recognition of the ABO would only serve
to ‘confuse and mislead’ participants, and that disclosing the net surplus or deficit
would cause DBPPs to develop more conservative investment and funding policies.6
The industry’s views were later endorsed by the ISC, which issued regulations based
on IRG that mandated the disclosure of abbreviated statements of net assets and
changes in net assets in annual financial reports sent by DBPPs and DCPPs to their
participants (Klumpes, 1994b). These regulations applied for reporting periods ending
on or after 30 June 1993, the same date at which FRS became effective. Table 1
summarizes major differences between FRS and IRG.
----------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
----------------------------------------------
3. Development of hypotheses
In this section, I make predictions about the relation between FRS use and
voluntary incentives faced by managers of Australian pension plans. Australian FRS
are unusual because they impose uniform financial reporting formats on both DBPPs
8and DCPPs. This setting thus provides an opportunity to investigate factors affecting
the decision to use a single set of financial reporting choices that are both independent
of managers’ other economic decisions for DCPPs and endogenous with the choice of
financing and investment choices for DBPPs.  DCPPs are by definition fully funded at
any point in time, since their ABO always equals the fair market value of their net
assets. The decision to use FRS is a ‘cosmetic’ one for DCPP managers.
3.1. Proprietary costs
Scott (1994) empirically tests Verrecchia’s (1983) proprietary cost theory in
the setting of Canadian companies’ election to incorporate additional disclosures
regarding DBPPs into their financial statements. It is likely that similar incentives
face DBPP managers in disclosing equivalent information to pension plan
participants, since disclosures are made to employees and their union representatives.
A proprietary cost to DBPPs of using FRS is that the fund’s net surplus or
deficit, which may be sensitive to minor fluctuations in investment or funding policy,
must be reported to pension plan participants. Unlike DCPPs, the ownership of
pension plan surpluses or deficits is a contentious issue for DBPPs. Section 4
develops surrogates for proprietary costs using results of prior empirical studies which
indicate that the presence of certain pension plan financial characteristics, such as
underfunding, investment policy and expenses, reveals the presence of a proprietary
cost - the cost of controlling the size of the pension plan surplus/deficit - which is
then influential in setting a pension fund disclosure policy when a new disclosure rule
presents itself. The proprietary costs hypothesis is stated as follows:
H1: Ceteris paribus, the probability of a DBPP (DCPP) using FRS is
9       negatively (not) associated with the proprietary costs attached to
      its ability to insure participants against retirement income risk.
3.2. Political Visibility Costs
For DCPPs, using FRS may avoid public visibility associated with not fully
informing participants about the full financial picture. During the period 1991-2, three
separate politically-motivated public enquiries were conducted into the adequacy of
pension plan accountability (Klumpes, 1994a). As is argued below, such issues are
more likely to be significant for DCPPs, whose investment and financing policies are
less susceptible to conflicting interests than for DBPPs. By contrast, anecdotal
evidence suggests that DBPPs which voluntarily used FRS suffered unfavourable
political attention and political costs due to a mis-understanding about its financial
impact (Walker, 1991).
I hypothesize that DCPPs with high political visibility would more likely
voluntarily use FRS than those with low visibility. However such trade-offs do not
arise for DBPPs because the disclosure is of a proprietary nature, which mitigates any
political visibility-related disclosure incentives. The political visibility hypothesis is:
H2: Ceteris paribus, the probability of a DCPP (DBPP) using FRS is
       positively (not) related to its political visibility
4. The Sample and Development of Variables
4.1. Sample Selection
10
Accounting data was obtained by random selection of equal-sized DCPP and
DBPP samples from the 1992 edition of The Blue Book, an annual professional
publication listing names and contact addresses of many Australian pension plans.
The final sample comprises 5% (or 54) of the Australian DCPP population, and an
equal number of DBPPs, which prepared annual accounts in the period 1991 to 1992.
For the sample pension plans and for all Australian pension plans in 1991-92,
table 2 reports a comparison of the mean size, expense and income ratios (as
percentages of total assets). Both fund size and income for the sample DCPPs and
DBPPs exceed those for the population, and the expense ratio is smaller. These
findings are expected because larger pension plans tend to have higher income and
lower expense ratios than smaller pension plans.
-----------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
----------------------------------------------
4.2.  Variable descriptions
An ordinal disclosure variable is used. ‘FRS’ is a categorical variable which
proxies for the level of FRS used. In each DCPP or DBPP sample, the dummy
dependent variable indicates whether the pension plans use (=1) or do not use (=0)
FRS in the study period.7
The first two independent variables, FUNDR and INVRISK, are intended to
capture proprietary costs are related to the pension plan’s ability to insure participants
against various sources of retirement income risk (Bodie, 1990). According to the
proprietary cost hypothesis, the probability of DBPPs using FRS decreases for those
with relatively low funding ratios or with relatively non-liquid investments.
11
 ‘FUNDR’ is the pension plan’s funding ratio. It is measured as the
relationship of total contributions received, plus gross investment returns, less total
benefit payments over the year ended 30 June 1992, divided by total assets of the
pension fund as at 30 June 1992. Poorly funded pension plans are more likely to be
sponsored by highly leveraged and unprofitable employer firms (Bodie et al., 1987),
and/or to be voluntarily terminated by the employer sponsor (Stone, 1987).
‘INVRISK’ is a proxy for the reputation-related risk that the pension plan’s
investment portfolio might be invested inappropriately by the financial intermediary
from the pension fund’s viewpoint (e.g.: investing non-liquid securities that cannot be
used to fund current benefit payments). It measures the percentage of pension plan
total assets that comprised classes of risky assets (eg: fixed interest securities, stocks,
property), as at 30 June 1992, that are not available to fund benefit payments for the
year ended 30 June 1992. Pension plans which invest in more risky assets are likely to
be sponsored by less reputable employer firms (Bodie et al., 1987).
The association between political visibility and voluntary reporting by DCPPs
implies that their disclosures are subject to political attention, allowing a test of the
political visibility hypothesis. Both contracting and political game incentives provide
potential motivations for politicians to impose political costs on DCPPs during the
time period at issue. In private sector research, firm size has typically been used as the
proxy for political visibility (Watts and Zimmerman 1990, pp. 139-140). The political
visibility hypothesis states that the probability of FRS use is greater for large DCPPs
which are more politically visible than small DCPPs.
 ‘SIZE’ is a proxy for political costs used by prior empirical accounting
studies.. It measures the net market value of assets of a pension plan in A$ million, as
at 30 June 1992.
12
However although size has been found to be an important factor in explaining
accounting policy choice, Lim and McKinnon (1993) caution against the
unquestioning acceptance of firm size as a proxy for political visibility. Mindful of
these points, in addition to the traditional size proxy, I also select a pension plan’s
expense ratio (EXPENSE) as a measure of the political visibility of DCPPs during the
period 1991-92.6 The political visibility hypothesis states that the probability of
DCPPs voluntarily using FRS is negatively related to the expense ratio incurred. By
contrast, Bodie (1990) notes that a DBPP’s expense ratio is likely to be subsidized by
the employer sponsor’s payroll system. Consequently the expense ratio is unlikely to
be less politically visible than for DCPPs.
‘EXPENSE’ is the pension plan’s periodic expense ratio for the period 1991-
92. It is measured as the sum of all operating expenses, excluding taxes, as a
percentage of net assets of the pension plan as at the nearest reporting date.
5. Results for the Hypotheses on Proprietary Costs and Political Visibility
Table 2 presents correlations among the independent variables and collinearity
diagnostics (Belsley et al., 1980). All variance inflation factors and condition numbers
are well below the suggested guide of 10, indicating that collinearity among these
variables is not a problem. Relatively unfunded DBPPs tend to have relatively higher
expense ratios. Remaining correlations between independent variables are generally
low.
-----------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
----------------------------------------------
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Table 4 presents the results of the logistic model using all variables. For
DCPPs (Panel A), the results indicate that the political visibility hypothesis has
significant explanatory power for DCPP disclosures. Both political visibility proxies
are in the predicted direction and are highly significant and the overall model chi-
squared statistic is highly significant. By contrast, none of the proprietary cost proxies
are statistically significant for DCPPs, as predicted in the null hypothesis H1. For
DBPPs (Panel B), both variables representing the proprietary cost hypothesis have the
predicted signs and are statistically significant. The SIZE proxy for political visibility
is insignificant, consistent with the null hypothesis H2. However contrary to
predictions, the COST proxy is statistically significant. The overall model chi-square
statistic is highly significant.
-----------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
----------------------------------------------
6. Summary and Conclusion
The results support proprietary cost explanations for voluntary disclosure by
DBPPs and political visibility explanations for voluntary disclosure by DCPPs. These
results corroborate and extend those of Scott (1994), by examining incentives facing
managers to disclose information to pension plan participants which is equivalent to
that provided by employers to the sharemarket.
A limitation of this study is that the proprietary cost and political cost
hypotheses may in fact be partially overlapping and that both attempt to capture
elements of political visibility. This concern is reflected by the evidence that expense
variable appears to be statistically significant for both DCPPs and DBPPs, suggesting
14
that it has both proprietary cost and political visibility implications.  However this is
mitigated by alternative empirical proxies which suggest that differentiable incentives
for FRS use influence pension plan managers of these types of pension plan.
This study extends the literature that attempts to empirically examine
proprietary and political visibility factors influencing managers’ voluntary disclosure
incentives. Future research is expected to develop methods and identify settings
which allow further examination of these incentives.
15
Endnotes
1. Defined benefit pension plans are those for which pension benefits are a function
of a multiple of years of service, multiplied by a factor and by average final salary
level. Defined contribution pension plans benefits are based on amounts
contributed and investment income earned on the accumulated contributions only.
2. Scott (1994) tests both hypotheses in his study, but notes that news favorableness
can only be tested for disclosing firms, reducing the generalizability of the results.
In this study, only the proprietary cost hypothesis is considered in order to
distinguish between disclosure incentives facing managers of DCPPs and DBPPs.
3. Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) investigate disclosure incentives in the
special case where proprietary costs are absent.
4. Unlike Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, there are currently no
professional Australian accounting standards for the disclosure of pension plan
information by employer sponsors.
5. Anderson and Sharpe, 1992,  Klumpes, 1994 and Herbohn and Sharpe, 1994
survey the level of voluntary compliance with FRS by samples of DBPPs and
DCPPs during the period 1991-92. The results of these studies generally find a
lower level of voluntary compliance with FRS by DBPPs than for DCPPs.
6. Walker (1991) cites the example of a large DBPP which voluntarily disclosed its
investments at market value in accordance with AAS 25, thus revealing both large
write-downs in real estate investments and a large net deficit. Politicians
erroneously charged that the pension plan was bankrupt.
7. Brennan (1995) finds evidence that the financial intermediary spread, or the
difference between the rates of return on a mutual fund’s portfolio and the amount
made available to retail investors, can be economically significant. DCPPs are
16
similarly structured to mutual funds and are managed by financial intermediaries.
During 1991-92, an Australian Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry publicly
criticized the high level of expenses charged by DCPPs by certain financial
intermediaries (Senate Select Committee of Inquiry, 1992).
8. Scott (1994) uses ordinal and categorical dependent variables in his empirical
tests. Empirical tests are also conducted for three-level and two-level FRS use.
The results are similar to those in Table 4 and thus are not reported separately.
17
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Descriptive Statistics for Sample and Population of Australian Pension Plansa
Sample Population
Mean Mean
(A$ million) (A$ million)
Panel A: Defined Contribution Pension Plans
N 54             1,938
Size 79.1      21.5
Expenses     1.73        1.92
Income     7.61          7.36
                                                                                                                                    
Panel B: Defined Benefit Pension Plans
N   54            3,325
Size 283     34.7
Expenses     0.61       0.66
Income     4.32       3.87
                                                                                                                                    
a
 The comparison is for the year 1991-92. The population is based on a census of all
Australian pension funds conducted by the Insurance and Superannuation
Commission (1993) in 1991-92.
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Table 3
Collinearity Diagnostics and Correlations Among ExplanatoryVariables
Collinearity Diagnostics Pairwise Correlation Coefficients
       Variance Eigen- Condition
Variables    Inflation value number      COST   SIZE   INVRTN  INVRISK   FUNDR
Panel A: Defined Contribution Pension Plans
COST 1.18 1.65 1.00       1.00 -           -    -       -
SIZE 1.17 1.50 1.05       0.04        1.00  -      -           -
INVRTN 1.07 0.85 1.39      -0.02       -0.03      1.00      -           -
INVRISK 1.08 0.65 1.59       0.14        -0.19b     0.03   1.00           -
FUNDR 1.34 0.34 2.21       0.27a        0.21b   -0.31a  -0.15        1.00
Panel B: Defined Benefit Pension Plans
COST 1.34 1.44 1.00     1.00  - -      -          -
SIZE 1.31 1.19 1.10    -0.32b       1.00 -      -           -
INVRTN 1.06 1.14 1.13     0.05          0.07       1.00      -           -
INVRISK 1.16 0.78 1.36    -0.18b      -0.11        0.04   1.00           -
FUNDR 1.06 0.44 1.80     0.06       -0.14         0.17b   0.09        1.00
Table notes: Variables are as defined in table 3. a < 0.01, b < 0.05
22
Table 4
Logistic Model of Determinants of Use of Financial Reporting Standards by
Australian Pension Plans
Panel A: Defined Contribution Pension Plans
Number of Observations = 54
Dependent Variable = 1, if plan uses FRS (n = 36)
= 0, otherwise (n = 18)
Intercept SIZE COST INVRISK FUNDR
Expected Sign ?      +    -       ?     ?
Coefficient   4.195  0.451            -0.587   -0.010 0.004
Std Error   1.470  0.228 0.205    0.012 0.016
Significance   0.004  0.048 0.004    0.405 0.803
Chi-Squared statistic: 16.18 (p = 0.003)
                                                                                                                                    
Panel B: Defined Benefit Pension Plans
Number of Observations = 54
Dependent Variable = 1, if plan uses FRS (n = 38)
= 0, otherwise (n = 16)
Intercept SIZE COST INVRISK FUNDR
Expected Sign ?      ?    ?       -     +
Coefficient   6.764  0.315           -2.284   -0.083           0.062
Std Error   3.747  0.269 1.161    0.040 0.036
Significance   0.071  0.242 0.049    0.035 0.083
Chi-Squared statistic: 16.92 (p = 0.002)
